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1. Introduction
If all we cared about was procedural equality, we could make our political decisions by 
flipping coins.  If all we cared about was the quality of the decisions made, we could let experts 
make our political decisions.  Is democracy then a compromise between equality and accuracy?  
David Estlund argues not.  Our commitment to democracy can be derived, he claims, from a fa-
miliar liberal principle of legitimacy.  The exercise of political power is only justifiable if it is 
justifiable to everyone concerned, where "justifiable to" means, roughly, acceptable without the 
need for religious or philosophical conversion, so long as one espouses one of the set of points of
view deemed reasonable or otherwise qualified.  Any claims to authority must pass this qualified 
unanimity test.  Even though some people do know more than others about politics and policy, 
the average person is not unreasonable to doubt this superior knowledge, or to doubt that experts 
are of good will, or at least to suspect that expertise is correlated with counteracting biases, given
that the acquisition of expertise is not a random process.  Democracy thus emerges as the epi-
stemically best decision-procedure that is not reasonably rejectable.  Other procedures might 
generate better outcomes, but the extra authority involved in these non-democratic procedures 
does not pass the qualified acceptability test.  Epistemic proceduralism is not a middle way 
between equality and accuracy because, as Ben Saunders explains in his essay, it ascribes no in-
dependent role to procedural fairness (Saunders 2010).  It is concerned solely with the epistemic 
merits of decision-procedures, subject to the requirement that these merits be sufficiently evident
to satisfy the liberal demand for acceptability to all qualified points of view.  Surprisingly, then, 
the case for democracy rests on the liberal demand that legitimate relationships of authority be 
invulnerable to qualified objections (along with the claim that the epistemic benefits of undemo-
cratic procedures are subject to such objections).2
The purpose of this paper is to explore a problem that arises from the fact that the quali-
fied acceptability requirement applies to itself.  Self-application implies that all doctrines identi-
fied as reasonable or qualified must recognize each other and only each other as qualified, a con-
dition Estlund refers to as "insularity" (55).  The broader the range of views identified as 
qualified, however, the less likely all such doctrines are to recognize each other as qualified.  
Conversely, the narrower the range of views identified as qualified, the less likely qualified 
points of view are to recognize only each other as qualified.  Whatever the range of qualified 
views, barely qualified views at either end of the spectrum must have an implausible asymmetry 
in the range of views they recognize as qualified.  Moreover, the standard of qualification is not 
the only element of the principle of public justification that needs to be specified.  Because the 
principle of public justifiability is an idealized unanimity requirement, it needs a default that ob-
tains in the absence of unanimity (on the part of qualified points of view).  Yet there is likely to 
be reasonable disagreement about what the appropriate default is.  A philosophical account of 
legitimate authority will have to be insular both with respect to the standard of qualification and 
the choice of a default, raising doubts about whether insularity is attainable.
Lack of insularity would not be a problem if the principle of public justifiability did not 
apply to itself.  Are there principled grounds for denying self-application, or would any such 
move merely be "dogmatic," as Estlund says (57)?  One possibility would be to argue that only 
reasons for the exercise of political power need be acceptable to all qualified points of view, and 
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that as a limit on the permissible grounds for state action, the qualified acceptability requirement 
need not itself be acceptable to all qualified points of view.  A second possibility is to adopt a 
convergence rather than a consensus interpretation of public justifiability, so that no particular 
reason justifying a particular policy need be acceptable to all qualified points of view, so long as 
the policy itself is.  A third possibility is to water down the standard of qualified acceptability, so
that only the basic, motivating grounds for the exercise of political power need be acceptable to 
all qualified points of view, not all of the assessments of fact and judgments about weighting of 
values that figure in the full justification of a particular law or policy.  This third approach is the 
most plausible, but it is ruled out by Estlund's insistence that all doctrines involved in the justific-
ation of the exercise of political power be publicly justifiable.  Epistemic proceduralism is for the
same reason vulnerable to a version of the asymmetry objection to political conceptions of 
justice.  If reasonable disagreement blocks state action based on contested conceptions of the 
good, why do not the reasonable objections of libertarians block redistributive economic 
policies?  The liberal principle that Estlund uses to justify democracy would seem to limit rather 
severely the scope of legitimate collective authority.  Estlund may have justified democratic gov-
ernment, but the strict liberal demand for legitimacy seems to block the possibility of a demo-
cratic society.
2. Self-Application, Insularity, and the Distinctness of Political Liberalism
One of the objections frequently made against the liberal demand for public justifiability 
is that the principle is self-defeating, since it enjoins avoidance of controversy and is itself con-
troversial.  Not everyone believes that political legitimacy depends on "higher-order impartial-
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ity," Thomas Nagel recognizes, "and if we forcibly impose political institutions because they do 
not meet it (and block the impositions of institutions that do not) why are we not being just as 
partial to our own values as someone who imposes a state religion?" (Nagel 1987:  222)   Dis-
agreement-avoiding principles are contingently self-defeating, Joseph Raz argues, if they are 
"absolute" (giving lexical priority to disagreement-avoidance) and "comprehensive" (applying to 
all disagreements).  Any such principle will be controversial, and hence cannot be relied upon in 
political decision-making (Raz 1998:  30).  One can reformulate the principle so that it does not 
apply to itself, e.g. 'political decisions must rely on no controversial principles other than the 
principle of public justification'.  Like Raz, however, Estlund is sceptical that there is any inde-
pendent reason for formulating the principle in this way.  Accordingly, he defines the scope of 
the demand for public justification very broadly.  No doctrine is admissible at any stage of polit-
ical justification unless it is acceptable to qualified points of view (53), and the term "doctrine" 
captures all kinds of reasons that one might invoke. "I use the term 'doctrine' "to cover a wide 
variety: factual statements, principles, practical proposals, moral judgments, and so forth.  Thus 
an acceptability requirement is itself a doctrine" (44).3  
One variable missing from the preceding analysis is the necessary idealization of the 
parties and points of view whose acceptance is deemed necessary by the principle of public justi-
fication.  If legitimate authority depended on there being a justification everyone in fact accep-
ted, the objections of the crazy and the vicious would defeat plainly sound and widely-accepted 
principles (4).  The idea of public justifiability is supposed to be a moral constraint on the exer-
cise of political power, yet there would be nothing moral in providing a veto over exit from the 
state of nature to the largest, most sadistic brute.  The morally salient fact that is supposed to be 
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relevant to the exercise of political power is the expected persistence of disagreement that is in 
some sense reasonable.  We are supposed to recognize that deliberation between people fully 
able and willing to reason together honestly about what is true and good will not converge, for 
some range of religious, philosophical, and ethical questions, at least not quickly enough so that 
all of the reasonable citizens of a democratic society could share the same general doctrine.  Es-
tlund abstracts away from the question of exactly what reasonableness consists in by speaking of 
"qualified" points of view.  The principle of public justification is thus a "qualified acceptability 
requirement," in his terminology, or a 'QAR' for short (45).  The fact that a particular QAR is 
controversial in a particular society does not make it self-defeating, because only qualified points
of view need accept the QAR.
Raz is aware of the fact that a reasonableness condition would allow escape from self-de-
feat, but thinks such a condition involves a form of unequal treatment.
A prima facie objection to restricting the required consent in that way is that every person counts. 
The life and well-being of those with unreasonable views are just as likely to be affected by the ac-
tions of political authorities as the life and well-being of other people. Moreover, their life and 
well- being are of moral consequence. They cannot be ignored, and if the other people's agreement
is required, so should theirs be. (Raz 1998:  33) 
The life and well-being of the unreasonable are undeniably of moral consequence.  The views of 
the unreasonable cannot be ignored by denying them the vote or the right to free speech.  The 
question is only whether there is a morally objectionable form of unequal treatment in my decid-
ing how to exercise my own democratic voice according to a QAR that considers only qualified 
objections.  There is clearly a kind of differential consideration of opinions in the moral principle
I am using to determine how I will vote, but whether this difference amounts to substantively un-
equal treatment is much less clear.  On certain accounts, at least, the commitment to public reas-
on is itself an interpretation of what equal respect requires (Larmore 1999).
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Despite its limited focus on qualified points of view, the QAR is not out of danger of self-
defeat, for it is not a matter of course that all qualified points of view will accept the QAR.  Es-
tlund labels the set of qualified points of view 'C'.  Suppose C = the set of redheads.  Many red-
heads would reject this specification of QAR; they would deny that acceptability to redheads is 
necessary for the legitimate exercise of political power (55).  QARREDHEADS would therefore not 
achieve "insularity," the situation in which each member of C recognizes the "rejection rights" of
all and only members of C (55).4  Its lack of insularity would seem to imply that QARREDHEADS is 
self-defeating, but Estlund prefers to call non-insular QARs  "self-excluding" (54), meaning that 
a non-insular QAR excludes itself from political justification.5  Strictly speaking, a proposition is
self-defeating only when its truth implies its falsity.  The truth of a non-insular QAR does not 
imply its falsity, but rather its inadmissibility to political justification.  Yet for a theory of demo-
cracy that rests on a QAR, self-exclusion (from political justification) is just as bad as self-
defeat.
Still, a particular QAR might be insular (hence not self-excluding in Estlund's terms or 
not self-defeating in Raz's terms) if we specify C more intelligently, not as the set of redheads, 
but (for example) as the set of reasonable citizens, à la Larmore or Rawls (willingness and abil-
ity to reason with others sincerely, recognition of the existence of burdens of judgment, etc.).  
The problem is that there is not only one insular version of C.  It might be, for example, that all 
members of a particular religious sect recognize the rejection rights of all and only their co-reli-
gionists.  Estlund concludes from this "impervious plurality of insular groups" that political lib-
erals must assert the truth of their acceptability requirement, and the truth of a particular specific-
ation of the acceptability requirement, which identifies C, the set of qualified points of view.  
5
Political liberalism cannot simply be reasonable, or acceptable to qualified points of view, be-
cause it needs to say who counts as qualified, and there are many possible standards of qualifica-
tion that might be acceptable to all points of view identified as qualified (57).  The QAR must 
therefore have both truth and qualified acceptability, while other doctrines need only qualified 
acceptability (Estlund 1998b:  266).  
Estlund agrees with Raz that there can be no political justification without appeal to the 
truth at some point.  Estlund says that his political liberalism is "substantive" rather than "wholly 
procedural" because it asserts the truth of its QAR, not just its qualified acceptability.  Raz's 
claim that "there can be no justice without truth" is wrong in one respect, however.  Political lib-
eralism is fundamentally a theory of legitimacy, not justice.  It must claim truth for its funda-
mental principle of legitimacy, but legitimate conceptions of justice need only be acceptable to 
qualified points of view, because of the truth about the priority of legitimacy over justice.  A 
society well-ordered by justice as fairness (for example) might not be truly just, "but it may yet 
be just in the only sense of justice that can legitimately be brought to bear in the fixing of politic-
al obligations and state powers, that is, being well-ordered according to a conception of justice 
that is acceptable too all reasonable citizens" (63).  
Having laid out Estlund's QAR, and partially defended it against the objection that it re-
futes or undermines itself, I want now to raise a potential problem that concerns the requirement 
of insularity.  The general question is whether there is a defensible specification of C such that 
all members of C accept QARC.  Estlund is aware that insularity may be hard to come by.  
"Doesn't it seem likely," he asks rhetorically,"...that there is qualified disagreement about who is 
qualified?" (60).  He admits that if the criterion for qualification is too broad (i.e. if it is too lax, 
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and accepts too many views as qualified), some qualified views will not accept the criterion (60).
However, I think that this admission understates the severity of the problem, because narrowing 
the range of views included in C is not sufficient to ensure insularity.  
Let us simplify by supposing that all doctrines can be arrayed in one dimension.  QARC, a
particular specification of QAR, picks out some range of doctrines C as qualified.  But each of 
these doctrines Di has its own set of views Ci that it thinks qualified.  Ci includes Di, because if 
one believes a doctrine one necessarily thinks it reasonable.  A natural question to ask is how the 
location of a particular doctrine such as D1 relates to the location of the doctrines it recognizes as 
qualified, the set C1.  Assume first that there is a correlation between a view's location and the 
locations of the views it deems qualified.  Suppose, for example, that each view Di is located at 
the center of its qualification set Ci, and that they each have the same range.
Figure 1: Qualification Sets: Ci correlated with Di
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C
1
C
2
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Figure 1 depicts a case in which QARC is not insular, most obviously because D1 does not accept 
D3 as qualified and vice versa.  The problem seems to be that C is too broad.  To achieve insular-
ity, we might narrow C.
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Figure 2: Qualification Sets: Ci correlated with Di, Narrow C
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Now that we have excluded D3 from the set of qualified points of view, our two remaining quali-
fied points of view D1 and D2 recognize each other as qualified.  QARC is still not insular, how-
ever, because D1 and D2 each recognize as qualified views that the other does not (for D2, views 
to the left of D1, and for D1, views to the right of D2)
We get the same result if we keep our broader C, while expanding the range of views 
each D recognizes as qualified, as in the case below:
Figure 3: Qualified Sets: Ci correlated with Di, Broad Ci
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Again, all of the views identified by QARC as qualified recognize each other as qualified.  How-
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ever, QARC is still not insular, because it is not the case that the members of C recognize only 
the members of C as qualified.  All members of C recognize that the exercise of political power 
must be acceptable to all members of C, but some members of C think that the exercise of polit-
ical power must also be acceptable to some views outside of C.  
In order to achieve insularity in this one-dimensional scenario, we have to suppose that 
the further a view is from the middle of our spectrum, the further it lies towards the edge of its 
qualification set, as in the case below.  
Figure 4: Qualification Sets: Ci uncorrelated with Di
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In this example, QARC is insular, because there is no correlation between the location of a view 
Di and the location of its qualification set Ci (and because the qualification sets all have the same 
range).  These conditions seem quite demanding.  The qualifications sets of the views at the out-
side edges of qualification display a puzzling discontinuity, and a strong asymmetry.  How is it 
that a view such as D3 cannot recognize a neighbouring view D4 as reasonable, but can recognize
a distant view D1 as reasonable?  Those in the middle might recognize those on either extreme as 
reasonable, but those at either end have a hard time accepting the reasonableness of those on oth-
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er extreme.  The broader the range of  C, the greater the asymmetry, for barely qualified Di at 
either end of the spectrum.  
One possible response to this objection would be to claim that being qualified is not a 
matter of more or less, but rather a status that one either has, or not.6  Without a spectrum, the 
problem disappears.  It is true that qualification need not be located on any ordinary left-right 
ideological spectrum, but most plausible criteria of qualification are going to be the kinds of 
traits that can be present to greater or lesser degrees, such that a question can arise about the 
threshold at which we will consider a doctrine to count as qualified.  Perhaps disagreement is 
only possible about the lower end of the spectrum, but this is not obvious.  For some traits plaus-
ibly associated with moral qualification it is plausible to think that there can be too much of a 
good thing, as well as too little.  For example, reasonableness is often thought to involve a will-
ingness to see things from other people's perspectives, to put oneself partially in their mindset as 
well as in their shoes.  Yet it is possible to carry role-reversal arguments across disagreement too 
far.  Someone who takes seriously how things look from the perspective of a lunatic or a moral 
monster is like Frost's liberal who can't take his own side in an argument (Nagel 1987:  215).  So 
long as the traits upon which qualification depends vary continuously, and so long as doctrines 
differ in their assessments of these traits, the problem of non-insularity threatens.
Another possible response  is to distinguish the rule that picks out members of C from the
set of members picked out by applying that rule correctly.7  Perhaps insularity requires only that 
all members of C accept the rule identifying members of C, not a list of the members C identified
by name.  Suppose, for example, that all redheads accepted the demand that relationships of 
legitimate authority be acceptable to redheads, but disagreed about whether Andrew is a redhead.
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Qualified points of view might disagree about exactly where to locate the boundaries between 
brown, red, and blond, but agree with the general rule that all and only redheads are qualified.  
Of course, we still need to know who is really a redhead, in order to know that they all accept 
this general rule for picking out members of C.  Also, in practice we need to make determina-
tions about who counts as reasonable or qualified; we need to say, for example, that doctrines 
committed to a fetal right to life based on belief in immediate ensoulment are unreasonable (see, 
for example, Williams 2000:  208).  Perhaps the correlation between the color of one's hair and 
one's views about where to locate the boundaries between brown, red, and blond would be small,
so that we would be very close to the situation depicted in Figure 4, but for more plausible criter-
ia of qualification, this seems to be a demanding assumption.   The basic question is whether 
there is a correlation between the extent of a doctrine's qualification (or the ease with which it 
passes the threshold of qualification), and its views about the proper boundaries (or threshold) of 
qualification.  Insularity requires that there be no such correlation, as in the case of hair colour, 
where those with bright red hair are just as likely to have a high standard of redness as are those 
with only slightly red hair.  It seems to me that this is a demanding assumption.  Those who are 
only barely reasonable are likely to have different conceptions of reasonableness than those fully 
reasonable.
Yet Estlund has a simple, and seemingly unassailable response to all doubts about wheth-
er insularity is possible; acceptance of the true standard of qualification is itself a criterion of 
qualification.  "The problem [of self-exclusion from political justification, i.e. what Raz was call-
ing self-defeat] is avoided if we say that one feature that a person must have in order to count as 
qualified is to accept the acceptance criterion including its correct account of qualified people" 
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(61).  Estlund is aware that this response may seem question-begging.  He points out, however, 
that we do accept that belief in certain propositions is a criterion of qualification.  We hold 
people to be unreasonable if they do not accept that people are morally free and equal, or if they 
deny that reasonable people can disagree.  Accepting the true account of qualification is just one 
more view people have to accept to count as qualified.  Yet acceptance of the true standard of 
qualification cannot be so easily assimilated to other criteria of qualification that involve the ac-
ceptance of particular views.
Estlund insists that, if it is not to be dogmatic, the QAR must be acceptable to all quali-
fied points of view as well as being true.  This rejection of dogmatism assumes that truth and 
qualified acceptability are two distinct criteria.  And so they are, in the case of views such as the 
claim that we are all morally free and equal.  It is an open question whether all those who believe
in universal freedom and equality also believe that political authority must be acceptable to all 
and only themselves, just as it was an open question whether all redheads accept QARREDHEADS.  
In contrast, it is true by definition that all those who accept the true standard of qualification ac-
cept that political authority should be acceptable to all those who accept the true standard of 
qualification.  There are not two questions: who is qualified, and whether qualified people accept
the standard of qualification.  There is simply a stipulation that to be qualified everyone must ac-
cept the true standard of qualification, so that no matter what the true standard of qualification 
turns out to be, people so-qualified accept it.  Making acceptance of the true standard of qualific-
ation a criteria of qualification effectively exempts this aspect of the QAR from self-application, 
and to this extent makes the QAR dogmatic.
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3. Self-Application and the Default
The standard of qualification is not the only respect in which QAR needs to be specified, 
and which could be the subject of reasonable disagreement.  The QAR is a unanimity require-
ment, and as such, it ordinarily requires a default.  With a balance-of-reasons or majority stand-
ard, it does not matter which of options A or B we label the action, and which we label inaction.  
Even if we incorrectly label A the action and B the option of doing nothing, we should still 
choose B if the balance of reasons tilts in its favour.  With a unanimity requirement, however, we
need to get these labels right.  If neither A nor B achieves unanimous approval (among qualified 
points of view), we need to choose the option that amounts to not exercising political power; we 
need to know which of A and B is the option that involves doing nothing and exercising no 
power. 
It is possible to demand (qualified) unanimity but to reject any choice of a default, if we 
acknowledge some higher standard of choice than legitimacy.  This seems to be the position 
Thomas Nagel adopts.  "Given the actual range of values, interests and motives in society, and 
depending on one's standard of justification, there may not be a legitimate solution, and then one 
will have to choose between illegitimate government and no government" (Nagel 1987:  218). 
Nagel's statement that we will have to choose between illegitimate government and no govern-
ment implies that there is a higher standard than legitimacy, a standard to which we may rightly 
appeal in making the choice of an illegitimate but nonetheless in some sense justified govern-
ment.  In contrast, Estlund is I think committed to the view that legitimacy comes first, and that 
in the absence of adequate public justification (i.e. when QAR is not satisfied), we may not exer-
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cise political power.8 
Estlund explicitly discusses a weak form of default: the tie-breaker.  If there are no reas-
ons for and against the exercise of political power, or if there are equally balanced reasons, not 
exercising power (non-authority) wins. 
Consider the idea that the "default" condition is the absence of authority... The idea that non-au-
thority is the "default" might... mean that there is no authority unless some positive moral case can
be made for it.  Absent moral considerations in either direction, a person is free from authority.  
non-authority requires no reason, on this view, and is the default in precisely that sense... So un-
derstood, I accept the idea that non-authority is the default.  As I have argued, the qualified accept-
ibility requirement burdens authority (and legitimate power) with the need for justification in 
terms acceptable to all qualified points of view.  Absent such justification, the default condition is 
the absence of the authority or legitimate power in question (120-1)
 The justification of this default might be that there is always something morally bad about coer-
cive political authority, so that the exercise of such authority requires a positive balance of reas-
ons, ties defaulting to non-authority.  Yet implicit in Estlund's qualified acceptibility requirement
is a stronger default.  Even if there is a positive balance of reasons (truly, or in my view), the ex-
ercise of political power is illegitimate unless acceptable to all qualified points of view.  The 
QAR thus imposes the requirement that the balance of reasons be so strongly in favour of the ex-
ercise of political power that one would be unreasonable (or otherwise unqualified) to think the 
balance negative.  Not only is inaction or non-authority the default in cases of ties, it is the de-
fault for cases in which the balance of qualified reasons is positive but not conclusively so.  An-
other way of arriving at this demand for conclusive justification is to ask whether views about 
where the balance of QAR-satisfying reasons lies must themselves pass QAR.  Since such views 
count as "doctrines," under Estlund's expansive account of the term, it seems that they must.  
Thus for the exercise of political power to be legitimate, all qualified views must accept that the 
balance of public reasons is positive.9
There will often be room for reasonable disagreement about which option should count as
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the default.10  We are agreed, of course, that the default is "no legitimate authority," but which of 
options A and B constitute no (or less?) legitimate authority?  It may seem that the answer is ob-
vious, because there is no ambiguity about what a state of nature is.  If option A is that no one 
has the right to make and enforce any authoritative rules, then so long as option B involves the 
enforcement of some authoritative rule, A is the default.  As soon as we have a state doing some-
thing, however, the addition of an extra law does not necessarily mean that the state is exercising
power more.  For example, if the state has a law against assault in public, adding a law against 
domestic assault makes it more active in one respect – beating one's spouse is no longer legally 
permissible – but less active in another respect – coming to the defense of beaten spouse no 
longer counts as an assault on the batterer, but the prevention of a crime.
A related problem concerns the level at which we apply the demand for idealized unan-
imity.  Do we apply the QAR globally, to one choice between a series of sets of laws and 
policies ('zoomed-out', as it were), or do we apply it locally, to many discrete choices between 
disaggregated laws and policies ('zoomed-in')?  At the global level, we might face a choice 
between a perfectionist state, a non-perfectionist state, and no state.  Unless one has a very rosy 
view of the state of nature, many specifications of a perfectionist state would be unanimously 
reasonably preferred to no state at all, and so legitimate if chosen democratically.  Applied at a 
more local level, the QAR will rule out a lot more state action.  It is unreasonable to reject police 
protection of property, but reasonable to reject taxation of redistribution, one might argue; it is 
unreasonable to reject having laws against murder, but reasonable to reject laws against abortion.
What results the QAR generates in these cases depends crucially on whether it is applied to the 
two choices separately or to one aggregated choice (protection of property and redistribution sep-
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arately, or choice of a system of property rights; murder and abortion separately, or choice of the 
scope of "murder").  Perhaps the correct approach is to insist on application at the level of max-
imum logically feasible disaggregation, i.e. zoom-in to the most fine-grained level of description 
of policy choices such that the different choices are still logically independent.  There is likely to 
be room for reasonable disagreement, however, about which choices can be evaluated independ-
ently of others.
Suppose now that we have decided to apply the QAR at the level of whole systems of 
property rights, which we take to include so-called "redistribution".  We agree that both an egal-
itarian and a libertarian system of property rights are preferable to none at all.  It seems then that 
we are permitted to choose between the two democratically, consistent with the QAR.  However,
if the exercise of political power must meet the QAR (or else we default to no such exercise), it 
stands to reason that the exercise of more political power must meet the QAR, or else we default 
to less.  "Some" vs. "none" is just a special case of "more" vs. "less".  It seems reasonable, there-
fore, to adopt an incremental version of the QAR for three-option cases in which the options can 
be ranked as to the degree of coercive political authority they involve.  Now, I am sympathetic to
the view that "redistribution" is no more coercive than enforcement of property rights; either the 
state is forcibly taking away some of my wealth and giving it to others, or it is forcibly protecting
that wealth from others.  Yet these questions are likely to be subject to reasonable disagreement. 
If all doctrines involved in the justification of the exercise of political power must pass the QAR,
and if doctrines specifying the QAR count as such doctrines, then both the set of points of view 
deemed qualified and the identification of the default that will obtain when the QAR is not met 
must pass QAR.  The QAR must now be insular in two dimensions, compounding the difficulties
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with insularity canvassed in the previous section.
4. Ways to Avoid Self-Application
Given the difficulties self-application creates, it might be useful to look for ways of justi-
fying what Estlund calls dogmatic political liberalism: political liberalism based on a QAR that 
need not itself be acceptable to all qualified points of view.  I want to present three ways to ex-
empt the QAR from the demand from qualified acceptability, and consider their costs.
The first questions the claim that there would something wrong in letting the QAR have 
authority over those who conscientiously (and reasonably, or qualifiedly) reject it.  In what sense
does the QAR have authority over anyone?  The QAR is a constraint on the exercise of political 
power.  There is therefore an important difference, one might argue, between exercising political 
power in a way that can only be justified by appeal to the QAR (assumed to be rejectable, now, 
by qualified points of view), and exercising political power for the sake of some particular, reas-
onably rejectable goal or value.  The QAR does not say what we are to exercise political power 
for; it merely limits the range of purposes for which we can exercise political power.  Therefore 
the authority it has over those who conscientiously reject it is qualitatively different than the au-
thority an ordinary value or principle used to justify the exercise of political power would have 
over those who conscientiously reject it.  Laws justifiable only by ordinary reasonably-rejectable 
values or principles force people to serve goals that they conscientiously reject; the QAR simply 
limits people's ability to use political power to make others serve goals they conscientiously re-
ject.  Therefore the QAR need not itself satisfy QAR.  
Is this argument persuasive?  Not as it stands, but it does suggest a way of reformulating 
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QAR so as to avoid self-application.  When is it necessary to invoke the QAR in political justi-
fication?   Let us divide reasons into the twin categories of public and non-public, and for and 
against some law or other state action.  The balance of public reasons for and against I will call 
the public case, and the balance of non-public reasons for and against the non-public case.11  In 
which circumstances will these citizens' accepting the QAR make a difference to what policy 
they support?  Accepting the QAR makes no difference when the public and non-public cases are
both positive or both negative, or when the public case in one direction outweighs the non-public
case in the other.  Accepting QAR can make a difference only if without it the public case would 
be outweighed by the non-public case.  There are two possibilities: 
1. Standard Situation: Non-public case supports action more than public case opposes.  Without
QAR, the agent supports action; accepting QAR would switch the agent's decision from act 
to not-act.  An example might be opposition to abortion laws on the part of someone who 
thinks abortion wrong, but who also accepts QAR, and recognizes that the reasons for think-
ing abortion wrong do not satisfy QAR.
2. Alternate Situation: Non-public case opposes action more than public case supports.  
Without QAR, the agent opposes action; accepting QAR would switch the agent's decision 
from not-act to act.  An example might be support for hate speech laws on the part of a com-
prehensive Millian liberal, who thinks that very broad free speech rights are essential to the 
realization of autonomy, but who recognizes that this conception of autonomy does not pass 
the QAR, and so supports hate speech laws on the public ground that such laws reduce the 
probability of harm to members of minority groups.
The alternate situation shows what is wrong with the idea that the QAR does not impose on any-
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one beyond the duty not to impose on others.  In the alternate situation, citizens would prefer to 
do nothing, but, accepting the QAR, find themselves required to criminalize particular forms of 
speech.  The QAR requires them, in this instance, to do something they conscientiously object to.
Although it is true that the QAR merely removes potential reasons for state action, rather that of-
fering a new reason of its own, it also removes potential reasons against state action, and there-
fore may in some cases tip the scales in favour of action.
Nonetheless, it is possible to reformulate the QAR so as to avoid applying to the alternate
case.  As currently formulated, the QAR applies to any reason invoked to justify acting or not 
acting, politically.  We might reformulate the QAR as a restriction on reasons for state action, 
not against:
QAR*: All doctrines supporting the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all 
qualified points of view; doctrines opposed to the exercise of political power need not be.
QAR avoids self-application, and so need not be insular.  Only doctrines necessary to justify the 
exercise of political need pass QAR*, and in the standard case, QAR* is not necessary to justify 
exercising power.  When the non-public case supports action more than the public case opposes, 
one must deny QAR* to justify state action.  Since in this case QAR* is not necessary to justify 
the exercise of political power, it does not apply to itself, and so need not be acceptable to all 
qualified points of view.    
The fact that QAR* registers no objection in the alternate situation is what it allows it to 
avoid self-application.  This same fact is also what makes QAR* objectionable.  Intuitively, there
is something wrong with allowing a negative non-public case to trump a positive public case.  
When Socrates suggests not enforcing contracts in order to make people less materialistic (Re-
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public, 556b), we want to say that discouraging materialism, even by inaction, is not the state's 
business.  
There is another way to avoid self-application, however, which is to distinguish between 
the exercise of political power and the reasons that support it, and to insist that only the exercise 
and not the underlying reasons need be acceptable to all qualified points of view.  Estlund's ver-
sion of the QAR is what Fred D'Agostino calls a "consensus" rather than a "convergence" ac-
count of public justification (D'Agostino 1996:  30).  Estlund's QAR demands that all of the doc-
trines invoked at any stage of political justification be acceptable to all qualified points of view.  
However, if fundamentally what we want is for the exercise itself to be reasonably acceptable, 
why do we need to demand that it be acceptable for the same reasons?  What would be wrong 
with a law or policy that was acceptable to all qualified points of view, based on each view's 
comprehensive set of reasons, even though a decision based only on shared reasons would go 
against the law in question?  Why should we not pass the law in question, if no one reasonably 
objects, even though the reasons that pass QAR do not justify acting?  We can formulate the fol-
lowing two versions of QAR, making explicit where they differ:
QARCONSENSUS: for the exercise of political power to be legitimate, there must be a set of 
reasons acceptable to all qualified points of view that is sufficient to justify the exercise 
in question, but it need not be the case that each qualified point of view would accept this
exercise of political power based on its comprehensive balance of reasons.
QARCONVERGENCE: for the exercise of political power to be legitimate, it must be acceptable
to all qualified points of view, but not necessarily for the same reasons.
On the convergence interpretation of public justification there is no constraint on the reasons that
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can justify the exercise of political power.  The QAR can simply be true, and its truth does not 
imply that it needs to be acceptable to all qualified points of view.  No doctrine need be accept-
able to all qualified points of view, but only the law, policy or exercise of power in question.  
Convergence interpretations of the demand for public justifiability thus escape the demand for 
self-application, and the problems it creates.
Could Estlund avail himself of convergence justification, in his argument for democracy?
Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier make the case for convergence justification in a recent article 
(Gaus and Vallier 2009).  One advantage of their approach, in democratic terms, is that no one's 
reasons get ruled out.  Even religious reasons are admissible to political justification, since all 
reasons are admissible.  However, this admissibility is misleading.  Although I may appeal to my
full set of reasons to determine what law or policy I would prefer, the law or policy will not be 
legitimate unless it is acceptable to all qualified points of view.  If citizens were to apply this cri-
terion themselves, in political debate and decision-making, they would not invoke any of their 
own reasons to justify a particular law, but simply make arguments about what laws all qualified 
points of view accept.  It is of course difficult to know what forms of the exercise of political 
power all qualified points of view would accept based on their comprehensive set of reasons.  
Gaus and Vallier do not expect citizens to figure this out, however.  Laws are legitimate only if 
acceptable to all qualified points of view, but citizens are not meant to follow this standard in de-
ciding what to say and do.  It is rather the designers of institutions who must have the principle 
of legitimacy in mind, as they craft democratic institutions to maximize the making of legitimate 
laws by citizens and law-makers aiming at various personal and comprehensive objectives.  This 
indirect form of justificatory liberalism is ingenious, but rather far from the traditional idea of 
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public justification, and I presume Estlund would not be inclined to move in this direction.
If our QAR must apply to itself, but self-application will lead the QAR to exclude itself 
from political justification, a third solution would be to water down the standard of qualified ac-
ceptability, so that it is easier to meet.  Nagel's response to the self-application problem takes this
form.  "It would be an impossibly restrictive condition on political power to say that its exercise 
may be justified only by appeal to premises that others could not reasonably reject."  The im-
possibility of reasonable rejection "must come in at a higher level," Nagel claimed.  For a  partic-
ular exercise of political power to be legitimate, it must be "open ended in the possibility of its 
investigation and pursuit and not come down finally to a bare confrontation between irreconcil-
able points of view."  The parties to the former kind of disagreement "can think of themselves as 
appealing to a common, objective method of reasoning which each of them interprets and applies
differently" (Nagel 1987:  231-35). Such disputes involve differences in judgment about the ap-
propriate weighting and application of common values or principles.  The liberal standard of im-
partiality does meet its own criterion of impartiality, therefore, "because it is defendable, and at-
tackable, by arguments of the right type," (Nagel 1987:  238) which is to say on grounds on the 
interpretation of impartiality itself (Nagel 1987:  223). To count as public, reasons need not be 
invulnerable to reasonable rejection, they need only be plausibly defendable based on some 
deeper, motivating values or principles that are not-reasonably rejectable.  If I understand him 
correctly, Estlund does not take this approach to overcoming the self-application problems be-
cause he insists that all reasons involved in public justification must pass the QAR.  The point of 
saying that a wide variety of things count as "doctrines," and that all doctrines must satisfy the 
QAR, is to say that each and every consideration necessary to justify decisions about the exercise
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of political power must be acceptable to all qualified points of view.  If the QAR simply deman-
ded plausible justifiability on the basis of some underlying grounds that are not reasonably re-
jectable, Estlund would not state the scope of the QAR in such uncompromising terms.
Consider Estlund's treatment of Mill's proposal to give the educated more votes.  Ordinar-
ily, one might object that this proposal involves procedural unfairness, an unequal distribution of 
political authority.  But Estlund does not want to appeal to equal treatment in the decision pro-
cedure.  Instead, he appeals to the claim that the extra authority the educated would have over the
uneducated is reasonably rejectable.  Estlund does not make things easy for himself, because he 
accepts that other things equal, education increases quality of rule (211).  He argues, however, 
that it is reasonable to suspect that other things are not equal, because the processes that determ-
ine who gets educated are not random, and so may introduce counteracting biases; this the 
"demographic" objection (215-19).  I have no quarrel with this argument, but merely want to un-
derline how demanding Estlund's standard is.  Mill's plural voting scheme would introduce "an 
element of rule of some by others" and so it must pass the qualified acceptability requirement 
(219).  This requirement is not the Rawlsian / Nagelian requirement that plural voting be plaus-
ibly justifiable in terms of underlying values or principles that are not reasonably rejectable, but 
that it be conclusively justified, i.e. that the voting scheme itself not reasonably or 'qualifiedly' 
rejectable.  Estlund therefore cannot accept Nagel's solution to the problem of self-application.
Rejecting Nagel's solution to the self-application problem has costs, however.  The weak-
er, Nagelian version of the public justifiability standard is essential to overcoming the objection 
that liberal legitimacy forces us to accept a minimal, nightwatchman state.  Jonathan Quong calls
this the asymmetry objection to political liberalism.   "If reasonable people disagree just as much 
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about justice as they do about the good life, then why are perfectionist reasons, but not reasons of
justice, deemed illegitimate grounds for state action?"  At first blush, the commitment to public 
justifiability would seem to lead to "a fairly libertarian view of legitimate state action" (Quong 
2005:  302-03).  This impression is misleading, Quong claims, for the liberal standard of legitim-
acy only demands plausible justification in terms (reasonably) shared premises, not unanimity 
(of the reasonable) as to substantive conclusions.  If reasonable disagreements about the good 
life tend to be "foundational," while disagreements about justice tend to be "justificatory," and if 
liberal legitimacy only demands neutrality with respect to foundational disagreements, reason-
ably contestable justice-based policies may be legitimate while perfectionist policies will gen-
erally not be (Quong 2005:  303, 311).  Quong's argument allows political liberals to be egalitari-
ans too.  Estlund's insistence that all doctrines involved at any stage of the justification of the 
exercise of political power pass QAR, and his broad definition of what counts as a 'doctrine', rule
out Quong's response.  
There is another way we can try to avoid Quong's asymmetry objection, and it is sugges-
ted by Nagel's response to the cases of nuclear weapons and the death penalty.  We don't think 
that reasonable disagreement blocks state action in these cases, even though the disagreements 
over these issues seem just as foundational as does the disagreement over abortion.  The differ-
ence, Nagel claimed, is that decisions about military and criminal policy are essential functions 
of the state.  Who's to say what's an essential function of the state?  Nagel's implicit criterion is 
made explicit in Jerry Gaus's argument from higher order unanimity, which I have already in-
voked (Gaus 2003:  159-60).  Every reasonable person agrees that it is better to have some com-
mon policy about military and criminal matters, rather than having private militias (some armed 
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with nuclear weapons) and Lockean vigilanteeism (minus the agreement as to the law of nature). 
In each case, two options A and B are reasonably rejectable against the other, but unanimously 
reasonably preferred to collective inaction.  It is therefore legitimate to choose from the set of ac-
ceptable options democratically.  This democratic escape clause works fine, but depends heavily 
on the level at which it is applied, and how the coerciveness of different policies is measured (if 
we adopt an incremental version of the public justifiability principle).  This is the problem of the 
default, which is fatal if we demand insularity.
It seems, therefore, that Estlund's liberal defense of democracy narrowly circumscribes 
the domain of legitimate collective authority.  His argument justifies democratic government, but
may preclude the possibility of a genuinely democratic society, as egalitarians and democrats 
have traditionally conceived of it.  Considered by itself, the ideal of democracy might require 
such a society, but liberal legitimacy does not permit the full realization of democracy, any more 
than it permits the full realization of justice.12  Liberal legitimacy justifies democratic decision-
procedures, but only within the limited sphere in which this rather libertarian liberalism permits 
collective decision-making.  
1. This paper grew out of discussion on the Public Reason blog, and has benefited greatly 
from the comments I received from Jonathan Quong and Ben Saunders, as well as from 
my being able to read earlier drafts of their papers.
2. This paragraph is meant to summarize the main argument of Estlund's Democratic Au-
thority (Estlund 2008). Henceforward all references to Democratic Authority will be 
made parenthetically in the text.   
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3. "The acceptability requirement has a logically interesting feature.  It says that political 
justification cannot appeal to doctrines that are not acceptable to all qualified points of 
view, and it is itself a doctrine appealed to in political justification.  It says, then, that 
even it cannot be used unless it is acceptable in that way" (53).
4. "Each member of C... must think that acceptance by all and only the members of C is ne-
cessary for a doctrine's admissibility... This amounts to a requirement that C be an insular
group in the following sense. Insularity requirement: Each member of C must recognize 
the rejection rights of all and only the members of C" (55).
5. Raz uses the term "self-excluding" to refer to an acceptability requirement framed so as 
not to apply to itself, which Estlund calls "dogmatic" (57).  Estlund reserves the term 
"self-excluding" for a QAR that does apply to itself, but which fails to meet its own 
standard, and therefore excludes itself from inclusion in political justification.  
6. Thanks to Jonathan Quong for this objection.
7. This objection is also due to Jonathan Quong.
8.  "I accept the idea that non-authority is the default. As I have argued, the qualified ac-
ceptability requirement burdens authority (and legitimate power) with the need for justi-
fication in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view. Absent such justification, the 
default condition is the absence of the authority or the legitimate power in question" 
(120).
9. There is an ambiguity about what exactly has to pass the QAR: authority, the right to 
make rules imposing obligations on others, or legitimacy, the right to use force to ensure 
that others comply with the rules.  The p.120 quote from Chapter 7 above suggests that 
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the QAR applies to both.  However, when Estlund distinguishes authority and legitimacy 
at the beginning of Chapter 3, he says that only a weaker form of the QAR applies to 
legitimacy.  "I defend a certain sort of necessary condition on the legitimate exercise of 
political power: that it be justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view... 
Later, I will argue that the acceptability requirement applies only to legitimacy and not to 
authority, though there is a weaker counterpart there". In Chapter 7, Estlund states that 
"[a]uthority, by which I mean the moral power to require action – can, in principle, be es-
tablished even without a generally acceptable justification if normative consent (the mor-
al duty to consent to authority if offered the chance) is present."  So the weaker standard 
that applies to authority rather than legitimacy is this: authority must be acceptable to all 
qualified points of view except in cases in which there is a moral duty to consent to au-
thority. There can thus be a moral duty to consent to authority even where it is reasonable
to reject this authority.  Yet the central case meant to illustrate normative consent is that 
of a flight attendant who issues orders in an attempt to help the injured after a crash.  
Despicable Joe does not consent, but his non-consent to authority is null, Eslund argues, 
because he morally ought to consent (124).  Is it not the case, however, that Joe is unreas-
onable not to consent?  Isn't this the reason the flight attendant's instructions have author-
ity over him despite his lack of consent?  In contrast, wrongful refusal to consent to sexu-
al relations is not generally null because such non-consent, even if wrong (in special 
circumstances) is not unreasonable. I will assume that legitimacy and authority stand and 
fall together, and that both must pass the QAR, but I'm not sure I've got Estlund's position
quite right.
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10. In this and the following two paragraphs I draw upon my "Public Justification and the 
Limits of State Action" (Lister 2010).
11.  It may seem misleading to speak of "the" non-public case, but let us suppose we are con-
sidering the situation from the perspective of a particular group of citizens, who share a 
particular comprehensive doctrine that supplies a set of non-public reasons.
12. "[T]he truth about justice, like the truth about salvation, may not be suitable for inclusion 
in a public conception of justice that seeks to justify the coercive exercise of collective 
political power" (Estlund 1998a:  108).
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